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Abstract 
Since 1996, the abatement regime and conditions of entitlement facing sole pare Ills in receipt of the Domestic Purposes 
Benefit have changed markedly. These changes were intended to increase sole parents' likelihood of supporting 
themselves and their families through paid employment. Were they effective in raising levels of participation in part-
time and full-time work? This paper addresses this question using a multiple cohort analysis based on administrarive 
data on benefit dynamics. It finds marked differences in the declared earnings of successive cohorts that coincided 
with the 1996 and 1997 Employment Task Force reforms, and strongly suggest that those reforms increased DPB 
recipients participation in part-time employment. lr finds no marked differences in declared earnings propensities 
following the 1999 DPB reforms, but marked increases in the probability of being off benefit which appear to at least 
partly reflect policy impacts on full-time employment propensities. l r is possible thar compositional changes associ-
ated with rhese increases mask changes in part-time employmenr propensities. This is an area for further work. 
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Since 1996, the abatement regime and conditions of enti-
tlement facing sole parents in receipt of the Domestic 
Purposes Benefit (DPB) have changed markedly, see Ta-
ble 1. These changes were intended to increase sole par-
ents' likelihood of supporting themselves and their fami-
lies through paid employment. 
Table 1. DPB Policy Changes 1996- 1999 
Date 
1 July 1996 
1 April 1997 
1 February 
1999 
Policy Change 
ETF Abatement change 
ETF Reciprocal obligations: 
Youngest child aged 14+ -
Part-time work test 
Youngest child aged 7-13 -
Annual planning interview 
Youngest aged 0-6 - No 
change 
DPB Review Reciprocal 
obligations: 
Youngest child aged 14+ 
Full-time work test 
Reversal of abatement change 
Youngest child aged 6-13 -
Part-time work-test 
Youngest child aged 0-5-
Annual planning interview 
Did these policy changes result in increased levels of par-
ticipation in part-time and full -time work? This paper pro-
vides an in-depth picture of what happened to successive 
cohons of sole parent DPB entrants as they moved through 
the reforms provides a tentative assessment of the extent 
to which changes in patterns of receipt might reflect policy 
impacts. 
Policy Change 1996-1999 
As part of the response to the Employment Task Force 
(ETF), a new abatement regime which offered greatly 
improved financial incentives to combine DPB receipt 
with part-time employment was introduced (Table 2). 
From I July 1996 the income threshold beyond which the 
main benefit began to abate was increased and the abate-
ment rate applying for the first $100 weekly income above 
this threshold was substantially reduced . 
Table 2. Abatement Rates Applying to DPB 
Income level 
($ per week) 
$0-60* 
$6 1-80 
$8 1-180 
$18 1 or over 
Abatement rate applying to DPB 
Before 1 July 
1996 % 
0 
30 
70 
70 
From 1 July 
1996 % 
0 
0 
30 
70 
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These improved fmancial incentives were matched by the 
introduction of ' reciprocal obligations' for some groups 
of sole parents receiving DPB, with provision for e}{emp-
tion: those with a youngest child aged 14 or over became 
subject to a part-time work or training test; and those with 
a youngest child aged 7- 13 who had received DPB con-
tinuously for at least a year were required to attend an 
annual planning interview. 
These requirements were gradually rolled out to existing 
recipients in the year from April 1997. The work test 
applied to new applicants from that date. The aim of the 
changes was to increase DPB recipients' participation in 
part-time employment, and raise awareness of opportuni-
ties for education and training, as a means of improving 
their chances of full-time employment and independence 
from benefit income in the longer term. 
In May 1998. changes flowing from the 1997/98 DPB 
Review were announced. Key among these were further 
changes to reciprocal obligations and abatement for sole 
parents receiving DPB. From I February 1999, recipro-
cal obligations began to be newly rolled out to some groups 
and strengthened for others, with provision for deferral. 
The work test applying to those with a youngest child aged 
14 or over was strengthened to require participation in or 
search for full-time work, and those with a youngest child 
aged 6 to 13 became subject to a part-time work test. 
Those with a youngest child aged under 6 who had re-
ceived DPB continuously for at least a year were required 
to attend an annual planning interview. and those with a 
youngest child aged 5 could be required to undertake ac-
tivities in preparation for the part-time work test. 
Those with a youngest child aged 14 or over subject to 
the new full -time work test became once again subject to 
an abatement regime that encouraged full-time rather than 
part-time work. This c hange was rolled out gradually as 
existing recipients came up for annual renewal and be-
came subject to the full-time work test. and was applied 
to new full-time work tested recipients as they came onto 
benetit. In cases where the work test was deferred , the 
recipient remained subject to the part-time abatement re-
gtme. 
Data and Method of Analysis 
We apply a 'multiple cohort analysis' to benefit dynamics 
data to contrast the experiences of cohorts of sole parents 
as they passed through the period of the reforms. 
Benefit dynamics data is administrative data taken from 
the Department o f Work and income payments system, 
SWIF I I, and reassembled so that it is possible to look at 
individual benefit histories. One of the advantages ofthis 
data is that captures the entire population of benefit 
recipients. The current analysis covers all people who 
entered DPB over the study period and is not subject to 
sampling error. 
A multiple cohort analysis has some advantages over time 
series analysis as a means of exploring the PQSsible effects 
of policy reforms. One of the uncertainties when 
considering time series data is the extent to which changes 
in the composition of the population, rather than changes 
in policy settings, account for any changes observed. By 
following a cohort of individuals through a period of policy 
reform, we can be sure that any change in the experiences 
of the cohort is not the result of changes in its composition, 
other than those that result from the ageing of its members. 
Ln addition, by following several cohorts we can tentatively 
assess the possible impact of a reform by comparing the 
change in experiences for a cohort that has passed the 
date at which a reform was introduced with that for an 
e.arlier cohort that reached the same 'age ' (or, in the case 
of this analysis, the same duration from entry) prior to the 
reform. Any 'difference in differences' observed might 
reflect the impact of the reform. Such an assessment can 
only be tentative. however. because the contrasting 
experiences of successive cohorts might also reflect: 
differences in their composition (consistent with the 
de mographic shifts in the sole parent population 
highlighted by Goodger and Larose ( 1999), later cohorts 
of entrants. for example, have a greater representation of 
those w ith o lder children and may be more llkely to have 
moved into employment by a given duration from entry). 
They also reflect differences in the rate at which they 
'mature ' (later cohorts might be more likely to enter benefit 
having worked in the past and may as a result move into 
employment w hen their c hildren are younger) or 
d ifferences in the wider policy, economic, or social 
environment faced by the cohorts at a given duration from 
entry. 
Table 3 shows the size and composition of the seven 
cohorts of sole parent DPB entrants that are the subject of . 
the analysis. The remainder of this paper examines 
differences in the benefit experiences of these cohorts 
discusses the extent to which these might be consistent 
with the impacts of the abatement and reciprocal 
obligations changes introduced since 1996. 
Changes in Participation in Part-time 
Employment 
In the absence of more direct measures, data on the earn-
ings declared by benefit recipients provide the best proxy 
for participation in part-time employment by benefit re-
cipients. Figure I shows the proportion of cohort mem-
bers in receipt of DPB who declared earnings at quarterly 
intervals from 3 1 December 1993 to 30 June 2000. Fig-
ure 2 presents the same data in a way that allows the con-
trasting experiences of cohorts to be more easily distin-
guished, and the possible links with policy changes to be 
explored. 
1 July 1996 - Abatement Change 
A clear change in the likelihood of declaring earned in-
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Table 3. Size and Composition of Sole Parent DPB Entry Cohorts, 1993-1999 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number in entry cohort 30597 323 11 34210 34300 31719 30598 30143 
Percentage of cohort 
Sex 
Female 89 88 87 87 87 87 88 
Male 1 1 12 13 13 13 13 12 
Ethnicity 
Unknown 18 15 8 4 5 5 6 
Ethnic comj>osition of those for whom known 
NZ Maori 35 35 35 34 34 34 34 
NZ and Other European 54 53 53 53 53 53 52 
Pacific People 9 9 9 10 9 9 9 
Other 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 
Age at entry 
Under 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
20-29 46 46 45 43 42 41 41 
30-39 34 34 34 36 35 36 36 
40-49 9 9 10 10 11 12 12 
50 or over 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Previously partnered? 
No 30 27 28 28 29 28 28 
Yes 70 73 72 72 71 72 72 
Number of children at entry 
1 56 56 56 56 57 56 55 
2 27 27 27 27 26 26 27 
3+ 17 17 17 17 17 18 18 
Age of youngest child at entry 
Under 7 79 79 78 77 77 75 75 
7-13 16 16 17 18 19 20 20 
14 or over 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 
Benefit receipt in year prior to entry 
Received DPB 25 25 25 24 27 28 
Received any benefit as primary 56 57 56 56 56 56 
Received any benefit as partner 26 23 21 20 22 23 
Received any benefit as primary or partner 70 68 66 65 66 66 
Reason for grant at entry 
Ceased work 10 10 11 12 12 12 13 
Separated from partner 53 51 49 49 47 48 48 
Child came into care 14 12 1 1 12 12 11 11 
Transfer from another benefit 11 16 17 16 17 17 16 
Other/not recorded 12 12 12 12 12 12 13 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
come can be observed following the 1 July 1996 policy the new abatement for a full year while the preceding eo-
change. Comparing the fust three cohorts in Figure 2 at hort, at the same number of quarters from entry, was yet 
the same number of quarters from the end of the year of to become subject to the new regime. Towards the end of 
· their entry, it is clear that up to 30 June 1996 (quarter 10 the study period, the three cohorts again tracked one an-
for 1993 entrants, quarter 6 for 1994 entrants, and quarter other more closely. 
2 for 1995 entrants) they tracked one another closely. After 
30 June 1996, each had a much higher earnings propen- The 1996. 1997, 1998 and 1999 cohorts entered the fol-
sity than the cohort that preceded it had at the same number low-up window after the introduction of the part-time 
of quarters from entry. Cohort-on-cohort differences abatement regime. At quarter 0 (31 December of their 
peaked at around three percentage points at 30 June 1997 year of entry), these cohorts had earnings propensities 
(an increase of22%). At this point each cohort had faced averaging 15 percent, five percentage points higher than 
43 
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Figure I. Percentage of Cohort Members on DPB Declaring Earned Income 
at Quarterly Intervals (Calendar Time), 1993.-1999 Sole Parent 
Entry Cohorts 
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Figure 2. Percentage of Cohort Members on DPB Declaring Earned Income at 
Quarterly Intervals (Relative to 31 December of Entry Year), 1993, 
1999 Sole Parent Entry Cohorts 
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those for the 1993, 1994 and 1995 cohorts at the same 
duration. 
A useful summary measure of the size of the change is the 
difference between the change in earnings propensities 
for cohorts as they passed the date of the policy change 
and the change in earnings propensities for earlier cohorts 
as they passed the same duration from entty. Table 4 
provides such a measure of 'difference in differences'. It 
shows three results: the average annual percentage change 
in earnings propensities in the year to 30 June 1997 (4 
quarters aftet the policy change) for the 1994 and 1995 
entry cohorts (A); the average annual percentage change 
in earnings propensities at the same duration from entry 
for each cohort's predecessor (B) and the ratio of these 
two measures (A/B). 
A year after the policy change, the 1994 and 1995 cohorts 
of sole parent entrants to DPB had, on average, 
experienced an annual rate of growth in earnings 
propensities twice that experienced by their predecessors 
at the same duration from entry. 
Comparing the size of this difference in differences 
between sub-groups shows a greater change in earnings 
propensities for sole parent entrants with a youngest child 
aged 7 or over at entry than for those with younger 
children. This may reflect the limiting effect of childcare 
costs and availability on the responsiveness of parents of 
younger children to the changed incentives. It may also 
partly reflect the fJISt-quarter impact of the new reciprocal 
obligations, which began their roll-out on 1 April 1997, 
and would be expected to be associated with a larger 
change in behaviour for those with older children (see 
below). 
Comparing the size of this difference in differences 
between ethnic groups shows a much more modest change 
for Maori than for members of other ethnic groups. This 
may partly reflect the greater representation of Maori 
among cohort members with younger children at entry 
and the greater childcare barriers to employment faced 
by that group. Maori recipients of DPB are also less likely 
than non-Maori to have fonnal qualifications (Statistics 
New Zealand unpublished Census tables) and more likely 
to live in areas with high rates of unemployment which 
may have affected their ability to find jobs in response to 
the policy change. Further analysis would be needed to 
establish, where possible, the independent effects ofthese 
factors in explaining differences between Maori and non-
Maori. 
The shifts in declared earnings propensities following I 
July 1996 are consistent with the expected effects of the 
new abatement regime on DPB recipients' participation 
in part-time employment. 
1 April 1997- New Reciprocal Obligations 
The new reciprocal obligations introduced as part of the 
response to the ETF were expected to result in a stronger 
impact on participation in part-time employment than 
could be achieved by financial incentives alone. As the 
reciprocal obligations rolled out from 1 April 1997, a fur-
ther increase in the likelihood of having declared earn-
ings was expected for those with a youngest child aged 
14 or over (subject to the part-time work test) and those 
with a youngest child aged 7 to 13 (subject to the annual 
planning interview requirement), but not for those with 
younger children (subject to no new reciprocal obliga-
tions). 
Figures 3 and 4 show changes in the likelihood of declar-
ing earnings for these sub-groups, defined by the age of 
the youngest child at entry. Those with a youngest child 
Table 4. Average Annual Percentage Change in Earnings Propensities at 30 June 
1997 for the 1994 and 1995 Cohorts Observed Passing through the 1 
July 1996 Abatement Change and for Preceding Cohorts at the Same 
Durations from Entry 
• 
A 8 Ratio 
Average annual % change in Average annual % change in (A/B) 
earnings propensities in year earnings propensities for 
to 30 June 1997 for the 1994 preceding cohorts at the same 
and 1995 cohorts observed durations from entry 
passing through 1 July 1996 
policy change 
All Sole Parent entrants 32 15 2.2 
Age of youngest at entry 
0-6 36 20 1.9 
7-13 28 7 3.9 
14 and over 26 7 3.8 
Ethnicity 
Maori 41 25 1.6 
Pacific 60 23 2.6 
NZ and other European 29 11 2.5 
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Figure 3. Percentage of Cohort Members on DPB Declaring Earned 
Income at Quarterly Intervals, 1993-1999 Entry Cohorts, 
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Figure 4. Percentage of Cohort Members on DPB Declaring Earned Income 
at Quarterly Intervals, 1993-1999 Entry Cohorts with a Youngest 
Child Aged 14 or Over at Entry 
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Table S. Growth in Earnings Propensities Experienced by the 1995 Cohort over 
the Two Year Period June 1996- June 1998 Compared with that 
Experienced by the 1993 Cohort at the Same Duration from Entry 
Percentage change in earnings Percentage change in earnings 
propensities for 1995 cohort over propensities for 1993 cohort at the Ratio of 
the period of the ETF changes same duration from entry differences 
Jun96- Jun96- Difference Jun94- Jun94- Difference (A/B) 
Jun98 Jun97 
All Sole Parent entrants 54 41 
Age of youngest at entry 
0-6 63 46 
7-13 43 36 
14+ 75 42 
aged 0-6 at entry (Figure 3) show a similar pattern to that 
observed for all entrants (see Figure 2): marked cohort 
on-cohort departures in earnings propensities began at the 
September 1996 quarter and peaked at the June 1997 quar-
ter before narrowing. 
The patterns for the older age-of-youngest-child sub-
groups are less regular. However, if we compare the ex-
periences of the 1993 and 1995 cohorts, it is apparent 
that the departures in earnings propensities following 1 
July 1996 are sustained well beyond June 1997. Table 5 
compares the additional growth in earnings propensities 
experienced by the 1995 cohort in the second half of the 
two year period following 1 July 1996 (A) with that expe-
rienced by the 1993 cohort at the same durations from 
entry, but prior to the introduction of the ETF reforms 
(B), across the age-of-youngest-child groups. For entrants 
with a youngest child aged under 6. the additional earn-
ings growth experienced in the second half of the two 
year period was similar for the 1995 and 1993 cohorts. 
For those with older children at entry who were subject to 
the new obligations, the 1995 cohort experienced greater 
earnings growth over this period. Those with children 
aged 14 or over show the widest margin between the ex-
periences of the 1995 and 1993 cohorts. 
. 
These differences are consistent with the expected effects 
of the ETF reciprocal obligations. 
1 February 1999 - Strengthened and Extended 
Reciprocal Obligations and Abatement Change 
From February 1999. reciprocal obligations were strength-
ened for those with a youngest child aged 7 or over and 
newly extended to those with younger children. The part-
time work test that was rolled out to those with a young-
est child aged 6-13 was expected to increase the likeli-
hood of those on benefit participating in part-time work. 
The annual planning interviews and work preparation 
activities which newly applied at younger ages were also 
expected to have this effect, but the scale of the response 
was expected to be more modest. 
A full-time work-test now applied to those with a young-
A 
13 
16 
7 
34 
Jun96 Jun95 B 
38 27 I I 1.2 
54 37 17 1.0 
19 17 2 3. 1 
-11 -14 3 10.7 
est child aged 14 or over who did not qualify for deferral, 
and those subject to this test were transferred to a steeper 
abatement regime that provides incentives for full -time 
work but disincentives for part-time work. Any change 
in the likelihood of having declared earnings while on 
benefit for this group could retlect the net effect of a 
number of different, and potentially offsetting, responses. 
For example: the strengthened work-test might have en-
couraged some recipients to newly participate in employ-
ment while on benefit: increased abatement might have 
discouraged some recipients from participating in employ-
ment while on benefit: increased abatement might have 
caused some recipients already combining benefit and 
employment to lose benefit entitlement; the strengthened 
work test might have encouraged movement off benetit. 
If recipients with earnings already were more likely to 
move this would leave a residual group with lower aver-
age earnings propensities. 
Figure 2 suggests that if any change in the earnings pro-
pensities of cohort members receiving DPB occurred as a 
result of the DPB Review changes. they do not show up 
as marked differences between the cohorts overall. Fig-
ure 3 shows no marked change for entrants with youngest 
children aged 0-6 and 7-13 at entry. There were slightly 
more pronounced than usual peaks in earnings propensi-
ties at March 1999 for most cohorts. However, over the 
year to December 1999, each cohort experienced slower 
growth in earnings propensities. on average, than that 
experienced by its predecessor over the year to Decem-
ber 1998. 
It is possible that little change in part-time employment 
occurred as a result of the February 1999 changes for these 
younger age-of-youngest-child groups. An alternative 
explanation is that a change in the composition of the 
groups remaining on DPB offset any behavioural changes 
that occurred. In Section 4 we find a marked shift in the 
probability of being off benefit following the February 
1999 changes. Those already in part-time employment 
may have been more likely to leave benefit at this time. 
We should also note that lags in the collection of income 
information from DPB recipients make earnings data less 
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reliable for the latter part of 1999 and this may also be 
influencing the findings. 
For entrants with children aged 14 or over the proportion 
declaring earnings declined, on average, for cohorts pass-
ing through the February 1999 changes, compared to an 
increase, on average for preceding cohorts at the same 
duration from entry (Figure 4). It is not clear without 
further analysis of individual transitions whether this re-
flects the effects of the compositional changes hypot.h-
esised above. or changes in behaviour consistent with 
earnings disincentives. 
Other Explanations f or Declared Earnings Changes Ob-
served 
It is important to note that there are other explanations for 
the observed shifts in declared earnings propensities. 
It is poss ible that part of the increase in earnings 
propensities that occurred around the time of the ETF 
reforms is more apparent than real. The ETF abatement 
change lowered the fmancial penalty attached to declaring 
income and this may have increased the proportion of 
benetit recipients making truthful earnings declarations. 
Reciprocal obligations, by placing work expectations on 
DPB recipients and/or increasing the frequency of their 
contact with case managers, may also have resulted in 
previously undeclared earnings being reported. 
Changes in the economy may have played a role. The 
growth in declared earnings propensities that followed the 
ETF abatement change may be partly explained by a gen-
eral expansion in part-time employment. HLFS data 
shows that the annual rate of growth in the proportion of 
the female working-age population employed part-time 
did increase over that period, averaging just under one 
percentage point (or 4%) in the four quarters to June 1997. 
A general expansion in part-time employment does not 
appear to account for changes observed after the 1 April 
1997 introduction of reciprocal obligations: the propor-
tion of the female working-aged population employed part-
time fell between March J 997 and March J 998. The slow-
ing of growth in part-time employment in 1999 may. how-
ever. partly explain the slower rate of growth in declared 
earning following the DPB Review changes. 
Other policy changes may have played a role. Both the 
ETF and DPB Revie w c hanges to abatement and 
reciprocal obligations were accompanied by a host of other 
changes. These included changes in case management, 
changes to welfare to work facilitative measures, increased 
childcare assistance, increased rates offamily assistance, 
and reductions in tax rates all aimed at increasing 
movement families into work. The 1998 benetit fraud 
campaign accompanied the announcement of the DPB 
Review changes, and an IRD campaign aimed at raising 
awareness of in-work family assistance accompanied their 
introduction. These events may account for some of the 
differences between cohorts. 
The shifts in earnings observed are unlikely to be explained 
by demographic changes however. While differences in 
the age structure of the parents and children in successive 
cohorts are likely to partly account for the small cohort-
on-cohort increases in earnings propensities observed over 
the study period as a whole (see Figure 2), by their na-
ture, we would not expect these differences to result in a 
large change in behaviour affecting all cohorts at the same 
point in calendar time. 
While other factors are likely to have played a role, the 
magnitude and timing of the changes that immediately 
followed the ETF reforms, and the contrasting experiences 
of sub-groups affected in different ways by the ETF re-
ciprocal obligations, suggests that these were largely the 
result of the policy changes rather than the economic, 
administrative and demographic changes that coincided 
with them. 
Changes in Participation in Full-time 
Employment 
The best proxy for full-time employment available from 
benefit dynamics data is non-receipt of benefit income. 
Although information on destinations at the end of spells 
on benefit and events that led to their commencement is 
collected, the rate of non-recording is high, and it is likely 
that neither measure accurately reflects the real extent of 
full-time employment between spells on benefit. In addi-
tion, information on hours of work, which would be needed 
to assess the extent of full-time employment while in re-
ceipt of DPB, is not collected. Non-receipt has its limita-
tions as a measure of the possible full-time employment 
outcomes of policy changes however. Many people leave 
DPB for reasons other than full-time employment, the 
prime one being partnering. Changes in partnering pro-
pensities, and changes in couples ' propensities to be off 
benefit, will therefore impact on our measure. 
Wilson (2000) explored possible links between the ETF 
abatement and reciprocal obligations reforms and changes 
in benefit receipt. During the period when the immediate 
effects of those reforms might have been expected to be 
felt , changes in the probability of benefit receipt were not 
marked. In this section, we examine changes in benefit 
receipt around the time of the February J 999 introduc-
tion of the DPB Review changes. Unlike the ETF re-
forms, the DPB Review changes were aimed at making 
an immediate impact on participation in full-time work 
and so we might expect to see more marked differences 
following their introduction. 
1 February 1999 - Strengthened and Extended 
Reciprocal Obligations and Abatement Change 
Figure 5 shows changes in the cohorts' probabilities of 
not being in receipt of DPB. Note that this captures 
changes both in the rate of exit from DPB, and in the rate 
of return to that benefit. The cohorts track one another 
relatively closely in the early part of the study but in the 
last two years clear cohort-on-cohort differences emerge. 
Members of each cohort were less likely to be on DPB 
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Figure 5 . Percentage of Cohort Members Not on DPB at Quarterly Intervals, 
1993-1999 Entry Cohorts · 
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than their predecessors after the February 1999 reforms. 
The differences between cohorts had emerged in mid-
1998, well before the reforms. 
Figure 6 shows that much of the increase in the likelihood 
of being off DPB that occurred in 1998 was associated 
with a sharp increase in the proportion of cohort mem-
bers on benefit as a partner from the June 1998 quarter. 
This appears consistent with increased declaration of part-
nerships as a result of the benefit fraud advertising cam-
paign which ran between April and June 1998. The exist-
ence of this s~~ft makes it difficult to isolate changes that 
might be consistent with policy impacts. 
Figure 7 shows changes in an alternative measure which 
avoids the complicating effects of the 1998 shifts in 
receipt. It shows the cohorts' probabilities of not being 
in receipt of any main benefit, either as a primary recipient 
or as a partner. Again, this measure takes account of 
changes in both the probability of exit and the probability 
of return. When we examine non-receipt on this basis, 
marked cohort-on-cohort differences do not generally 
emerge until after the February 1999 changes. For the 
1994-1996 cohorts, cohort-on-cohort differences began 
in the March 1999 quarter. For the 1997 cohort, a marked 
departure from the pattern followed by earlier cohorts was 
apparent at June 1998, and widened from the March 1999 
quarter. The 1998 and 1999 cohorts of entrants whom we 
follow only after the introduction of the DPB Review 
changes had the highest probabilities of being not in receipt 
of benefit. 
Are these changes consistent with the expected effects of 
the DPB Review changes on participation in full-time 
employment? Table 6 compares the average percentage 
of cohort members not in receipt of any benefit two quar-
ters from the end of their year of entry across different-
• I 
age-of youngest-chtld sub-groups. Overall, the average 
probability of being off benefit at two quarters (or 30 June 
of the year following their entry to benefit ) was 3 per-
centage points higher for cohorts passing this point after 
February 1999 (25 percent compared with 22 percent for 
preceding cohorts), an increase of 14 percent. The size 
of the increase was greatest for those with a youngest child 
aged 14 or over at entry. This is consistent with the ex-
pected policy impacts. 
However, the increase in non-receipt was also pronounced 
for those with younger children not targeted by the full-
time work-test. The reforms may have had a signalling 
effect which led to wider changes in full-time employ-
ment propensities than expected. Or the referrals and as-
sistance received as a result of planning interviews and 
part-time work testing may have assisted people wanting 
to move into full-time work to make the transition. This 
is unlikely to explain all of the shift however. Other fac-
tors are likely to explain much of the reduction in benefit 
receipt. 
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Figure 6. Percentage of Cohort Members on Benefit as a Partner at Quarterly Intervals, 
1993-1999 Entry Cohorts 
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Figure 7. Percentage of Cohort Members Not on Any Benefit Either as Primary or 
Partner at Quarterly Intervals, 1993-1999 Entry Cohorts 
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Table 6. Change in Percentage Not in Receipt of Any Benefit at Two Quarters from 
the End of the Year of Entry - Averages for Cohorts Reaching Two 
Quarters Before and After the February 1999 Policy Change 
A 8 
Average percentage not in 
receipt of any benefit at Q2 for 
cohorts passing Q2 after 
February 1999 
Average percentage not in 
receipt of any benefit at Q2 for 
cohorts passing Q2 prior to 
February 1999 
Ratio 
(A/8) 
All Sole Parent entrants 
Age of youngest at entry 
0-6 
7-13 
14 and over 
Ethnicity 
Maori 
Pacific 
NZ and other European 
25 
22 
30 
38 
20 
25 
28 
Other Explanations for Changes in Non-receipt Observed 
Changes in employment conditions appear likely to have 
played a role. HLFS data show an increase in full -time 
employment propensities for partnered as well as sole 
mothers between the December 1998 and December 1999 
quarters. This suggests that some of the reduction in co-
hort members' benetit receipt over that period may have 
been due to improved opportunities for full-time work 
among women with dependent children more generally. 
Any improvement in male employment rates might also 
have had the effect of reducing cohort members' benefit 
receipt, both by increasing the employment rates of sole 
fathers, and by reducing the likelihood that sole mothers 
who Left DPB as a result of partnering remained on ben-
efit. HLFS data show that full-time employment propen-
sities of partnered fathers dipped in the quarter following 
the February 1999 policy change, but rose over most of 
the ensuing year. The reduction in the likelihood of co-
hort members being on benefit as a partner from mid-
1999 (Figure 6), and the rise in non-receipt overall over 
that period (figure 7) is likely to partly reflect this im-
• • 
provement. 
The lll..FS also records faster growth in full-time employ-
ment propensities for Maori men and women than non-
Maori men and women over the period. The larger reduc-
tion in benefit receipt for Maori than for European and 
Pacific cohort members following February 1999 shown 
in Table 6 may partly reflect this. 
Other policy events could also have contributed to the 
shift in non-receipt observed. 
A subsidy for the costs of after school and school holiday 
care (the OSCAR subsidy) was introduced as part of the 
wider DPB Review package of reforms. This may have 
assisted some sole parents with children in the eligible 
age range (5-13 years) to take up full-time employment. 
22 
20 
26 
33 
15 
21 
24 
1.14 
1.12 
1.15 
1.17 
1.28 
1.15 
1.17 
Other facilitative measures introduced as part of the DPB 
Review may have also assisted people with younger chil-
dren into full-time paid work. 
An Inland Revenue Department advertising campaign 
promoting in work family assistance coincided with the 
February 1999 introduction of the DPB Review change. 
The campaign may have increased the level of income 
that sole parents and couples in receipt of benefit per-
ceived they would receive on moving into full-t.ime work. 
At the beginning of 1999, new rules re-focussing eligibil-
ity to the Training incentive Allowance (TIA) in line with 
the new work expectations, introducing more work 
focussed case management to determine e ligibility to the 
payment, and increasing t.he contribution to costs required 
of some course participants also came into effect. These 
changes led to lower lake-up ofTIA and are likely to have 
reduced DPB recipients' participation in education and 
training. This may have increased availability for em-
ployment. 
It is possible that by 1999, the longer-term effects on full-
time employment propensities sought by the ETF changes 
were beginning to become apparent. To the extent that 
the ETF changes increased participation in part-time em-
ployment, and to the extent that this led to higher full-
time earnings propensities, they may, together with the 
tax cuts, and changes to Family Assistance that occurred 
over the period, have raised the in-work incomes of sole 
parents leaving benetit for work or relationships, and led 
to more sustained exits. 
The proximity of policy events, and the combination of 
long-term and immediate possible policy impacts, is likely 
to make statistical analysis to isolate the impact of the 
DPB Review reforms problematic. 
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Conclusion 
This paper uses benefit dynamics data to examine pat-
terns of benefit use by successive cohorts of sole parent 
entrants to the DPB as they passed through the period of 
the ETF and DPB Review changes to reciprocal obliga-
tions and benefit abatement. 
It finds large changes in the propensity to declare earn-
ings following the ETF reforms that are consistent with 
their expected impacts on participation in part-time em-
ployment. The magnitude and timing of the changes, and 
the contrasting experiences of sub-groups affected in dif-
ferent ways by the ETF reciprocal obligations, suggests 
that these changes were largely the result of the policy 
changes rather than the economic, administrative and de-
mographic changes that coincided with them. 
Links between the DPB Review changes and changes in 
the declared earnings of those on DPB are less clear. Aside 
from a small shift in the first quarter immediately follow-
ing the introduction of the changes, we do not see marked 
increase in earnings propensities. Further work is needed 
to assess whether a higher rate of exit from benefit among 
those already in part-time work masks a greater change. 
The DPB Review changes were followed by a marked 
increase in cohort members' likelihood of being off ben-
efit . The scale of the increase when measured 2 quarters 
from the end of the year of entry was greatest for entrants 
with a youngest child aged 14 or over subject to a full-
time work test which is consistent with the expected policy 
impacts. However, the increase in non-receipt was also 
marked for those with younger children which suggests 
that other factors, including other policy changes as well 
as general improvements in employment rates, are likely 
to also partly account for the change. 
Qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the DPB Re-
view reforms currently underway will enhance our un-
derstanding of the individual experiences of the reforms 
and our appreciation of the extent to which the reforms 
can account for the changes in benefit receipt that have 
accompanied them. The evaluations will also seek to an-
swer important questions that cannot be addressed using 
benefit dynamics data: how did the reforms impact on 
parents· abilities to meet their care, control and support 
responsibilities, and what was the impact of the reforms 
on children in the families affected? 
Future Research 
The analysis presented here provides a high level explo-
ration of changes in patterns of receipt that might be con-
sistent with policy impacts. Multivariate analysis to esti-
mate the size of the impact of the ETF changes on part-
time employment propensities. controlling for other fac-
tors, is an option for future research. The complexity of 
the policy environment that surrounded the February 1999 
changes suggests that even with multivariate analysis we 
will be unable to arrive at an estimate of the impact of the 
DPB Review changes. 
Further analysis of the individual transitions behind the 
overall patterns observed could also improve our under-
standing of the changes that have occurred. For example, 
were those who already participated in part-time employ-
ment more likely than those who didn't to move off ben-
efit following the February 1999 changes? And could 
compositional shifts therefore explain the absence of a 
more marked increase in earnings propensities for those 
on benefit? 
Notes 
l We would like to thank Ron Lovell, Simon Chapple, 
John Jensen and Mike Rochford for their helpful 
comments on this paper. The views expressed are not 
necessarily those of the Ministry of Social Policy. 
2 DPB is an income-tested benefit payable to sole parents. 
It can also be paid to those providing full-time care for a 
sick or infJJlll person ("carers") and older single women 
without dependent children ("women alone"). This pa-
per only examines sole parent recipients of the benefit. 
3 Reciprocal obligations were also introduced for women 
alone and carers receiving DPB and some partners of un-
employment benefit recipients. 
4 Reciprocal obligations were also strengthened for and/or 
extended to women alone and carers receiving DPB and 
partners of recipients of all other working age benefits. 
The abatement change also applied to women alone re-
ceiving DPB. 
5 This entailed an increase in the abatement rate applying 
to additional income between $81 and $180 per week 
from 30% to 70%. 
6 See Wilson ( 1999) for a description of benefit dynamics 
data. 
7 The cohorts include all sole parents granted DPB in a given 
calendar year and are not confined to first ever entries 
into the benefit system. A person can therefore appear in 
more than one cohort if they had grants in more than one 
calendar year. Data for years prior to 1993 are not 
sufficiently robust to be included in the benefit dynamics 
data set. and for this reason it is not possible to examine 
the experiences of earlier entry cohorts. Members of the 
seven entry cohorts that can be studied made up 44% of 
all sole parents in receipt of DPB on 31 December 1994 
and 86% of sole parents in receipt on 31 December 1999. 
Those who received benefit at these dates but are excluded 
from the analysis are earlier entrants who received DPB 
continuously throughout the study period (very long-term 
DPB recipients) or ceased receiving DPB within the study 
period and did not return. 
8 These data require some caution in interpretation. See 
Wilson (2000). 
9 Note that it is possible to work full-time and still be in 
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receipt of DPB if the recipient still meets the income 
test after any income is taken into account. In the 
abience of information on hours of work it is not 
possible to identify cases where this occurs. 
10 Defmed as the proportion of cohon members in receipt 
of DPB who had declared earnings. 
11 In sonte cases informatien on actual income js not col-
lected until the annual renewal of benefit. This means 
that earnings data for the latter pa11 of 1999 wiU not be 
fully complete until the end of 2000. This may influence 
the comparison, but given that the current analysis was 
based on data extracted at 31 October 2000, it is unlikely 
to change the conclusions for the March, June and Sep-
tember quarters following the introduction of the Febru-
ary 1999 changes. 
11 See Wilson (2000) for a chronoLogy of these events. 
12 Some could stiU receive supplementary assistance, such 
as the Accommodation Supplement. as non-beneficiar-
ies. 
14 For all but qua11er 0 for the 1998 cohon. 
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